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PRIVATE BOUNDARIES IN MAINE.
I. Definition.
It is the purpose of the writer to deal in this thesis 
with only private boundries and not with county, state or in­
ternational boundries.
Perhaps the beet definition of a boundry is this:-
*Any separation, natural or artificial, which marks the con­
fines or line of two contiguous estates. The term is applied 
to include objects placed or existing at the angles of the 
bounding lines, as well as those which extend along the lines 
of separation."
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.
II. Creation.
Having defined what a boundary is, the next step will be 
to look at the methods of creating them and the several classes 
of boundries. In general boundries divide themselves into two 
classes, Natural and Artificial. But of whichever class it may 
chance to be, its creation is first in importance.
The creation of boundries by deed is, of course, the most 
common and will be taken up in a later part of this thesis. Pa­
rol and actual location, long acquieseed in,agreement by parol,
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followed, by acquiescance are all of importance.
Whether location of a boundry by parol is sufficient was 
the issue in the case of Grove v. Richardson, 4 Maine 327«
The case was an action to recover seisin and possession of 
certain land. It was settled that a dividing line that had long 
been fixed and acquiesced in by the parties ought to be upheld 
unless it was clearly erroneous. Weston, Justice, in very apt 
words, covered well the situation when he said, "A dividing line, 
between owners of adjoining tracts, may be settled by them under 
a misapprehension or mistake, which, if clearly shown, may be 
corrected, but unless this act of the parties be regarded as 
strong evidence of the accuracy of the line thus amicably estab­
lished, a fruitful source of litigation will be left open, of 
which one or both the parties may avail themselves when under 
less friendly feelings."
Grove v. Richardson, Maine 327*
This principle was upheld and further applied in Moody v. 
Nichols, 16 Maine 23.
Later the above principle was made binding in a case coming 
up on a writ of entry. A fence was built on what was agreed to 
be the line just after the deed was made. This fence was con­
sidered to be the line for several years. The court held this 
line as agreed upon would be upheld, although not conforming 
with the original calls in the deed.
Knowles v. Toothaker, $8 Maine 172.
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III. Construction.
A. In General.
It is settled law in Maine that in the case of a deed 
or conveyance which is in some •particulars false, the false part 
will be rejected, and the true part retained if sufficient.
In a certain case the land was described as "beginning at a stak 
and stones standing in the north corner of that part of the lot, 
which the judgment debtor bought of Harvey Wait," in truth no 
part of the lot had been bought of Wait. That part of the de­
scription was rejected and the truth was established and upheld.
Wing v. Burgis, 13 Maine 111.
The intention of the parties as appear from the in­
strument will be upheld by the court.
A lot was described as follows: "Twenty acres of lan 
in lot 56 in the 120 acre lot west side of Royal’s River in Nor 
Yarmouth, and bounded as follows; viz., Beginning on the wester} 
side of said river, by the river at the dividing line betwixt tb 
land owned by Hannah Russell and the grantor in the aforesaid 
lot, thence running westerly on said dividing line so far that a 
line running southerly parallel with the westerly end line of 
said lot, until it comes within six rods of the southerly side 
line of said lot, thence easterly, keeping the width of six 
rods from said side line to Royal’s river aforesaid, thence by 
eaid river to the bounds first mentioned, containing twenty 
acres of land." The court held that although the deed recited 
the exact amount of land intended, yet the calls of the deed 
were clear and were such that they must be given effect to, and 
if.the monuments were established they would hold good.
Dunn v. Hayes, 21 Maine 76.
In the construction of description it is the law that every 
call must be answered, if it can be done. "The intention of the 
parties is to be sought by looking at the whole, and none is to 
be rejected, if all the parts can stand consistently together."
The above quotation is from the opinion of Tenney, J. in 
Herrick y.Hopkins, 23 Maine 217•
B. Plans.
Where the description of the land is by reference to a 
plan and there is no other description its location and limits 
must depend altogether on the plan.
Thomas v. Patten, 13 Maine 329-
A deed contained the following clause, "said premises being 
lot numbered fifty-two on the plan of said town of Dennysville, 
etc." The court held that the plan referred to became a part of 
the deed a3 much as if incorporated therein.
Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Maine 169.
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C. Particular Words.
The Maine court has had occasion to rule on the construction 
of many particular words. The writer will endeavor to take up 
the more important decisions.
A deed read as follows: "Easterly eighty-four feet on land 
of L." L’s land extended only about half that distance. Held, 
the boundary would be the extension of L’s line in the same di­
rection.
Ricker v. Barry, 3^ Maine 116.
The words southwest line means due southwest, and not in a 
southwesterly direction.
Robinson v. Miller, 37 Maine 312.
"Beginning at a stake and stones, etc." This establishes the 
governing corner and all distances, directions and calls and 
courses, depend on this corner.
Wiswell v. Marston, 5^ Maine 270.
The above case of Wjswell v. Marston also settles the law 
that the expression "running on line" means the true line of 
division.
The words "to a certain person’s land" do not mean to land 
that happens to be occupied by that person, but to such land as 
he owns himself.
Jewett v. Hussey, 70 Maine 433•
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Rather a peculiar case arose out of a conveyance that read 
in part "said boundary by the upland to be located and fixed by 
said R and L." It was decided that under such a deed R and L 
had the power of locating the boundry line subject to the remain­
der of the description in the deed.
Haynes v. Jackson, 66 Maine 93-
.The Maine court defined "crossing the bar" as meaning pass­
ing clear across the entire width of the bar on the line of low 
water.
Bremen v. Bristol, 66 Maine 35^*
In the case of a boundary on a well established line to 
extend to stake and stones, which stake and stones are not in 
said line, the line will be considered as a continuing monument 
and will govern.
White v, Jones, 67 Maine 20.
The words "south to X’e land"and also northerly and easterly 
have been held to mean due south or north as the case may be.
Reed v. Knight, 37 Maine 137.
Foster v. Foss, 77 Maine 279•
D. Uncertainty.
It is clear that the intention of the parties when discovered 
governs. In case of any uncertainty in the description the rule 
must obviously be that those parts may be disregarded and the
7
intention gathered from the remainder of the description.
Such was the situation and holding in Madden v. Tucker, U6 
Maine 3^7.
IV. Evidence.
A. Burden of Proof
The general rule as to the burden of proof is the same as in 
all cases being upon-the plaintiff or claimant, but should the 
defendant interpose a defense in the nature of a claim of right 
the burden may shift to him.
Black v. Grant, $0 Maine
The weight of authority is that the party who sets up a 
claim of a certain particular^oundary or monument must intro­
duce proof of same. Also, in case of agreements settling boun­
daries between adjoining lands, he must affirmatively prove the 
agreement on which the claim is based.
On the first of the above stated rules Maine has ruled and 
she agrees with the weight of authority.
Robinson v. White, ^2 Maine 209.
There is, however, no ruling on the second point, but the 
writer believes Maine would hold with the weight of authority.
B. Admissibility.
I might state the general rule to be that the same kind of 
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evidence is admissible to establish boundaries as is admissible 
in the case of other disputed issues.
• Tradition evidence of boundary,by the weight of author­
ity, was and is admissible to establish ancient boundaries, both 
public and private,
This is not the law in our own jurisdiction. In the 
case of public boundaries it is clearly admissible, but not where 
private boundaries are in issue.
Chapman v. Twitehell, 37 Maine 59•
Should a private line be proved to coincide with a public 
line then it is obvious that tradition evidence would be admis­
sible .
Deeds and grants, such as have a tendency to identify and 
define the boundary that is in issue, are properly admissible.
Chase v. White, 41 Maine 228.
Parol evidence of the agr°ement of the parties in locating 
boundaries after the deed is made, is properly admissible.
Wing v. Burges, 13 Maine 11.
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V• Monuments.
Monuments are of two kinds, natural and artificial.
If in a description of boundries of land, a natural monu­
ment is called for, the identification of this monument is to 
be made by a fair and reasonable construction and interpretation 
of the whole instrument. Regard must be had, however, for the 
true intent of the parties as expressed therein.
Nelson v. Butterfield, 21 Maine 220.
Artificial monuments are monuments or signs erected and 
placed by the hand of mankind, as before stated. The identifi­
cation of an artificial monument is a question for the jury to 
be gathered from the instrument and testimony.
"What are boundries of land conveyed by a deed, is a ques­
tion of law. Where the boundaries are is a question of fact. An 
existing line of an adjoining tract may as well be a monument 
as any other object. And the identity of a monument found 
upon the ground with one referred to in the deed, is always a 
question for the jury."
Davie, J. in Abbott v. Abbott, 51 Maine 575•
Monuments not located actually at the time of making the 
conveyance, but located by agreement immediately thereafter 
will control.
Kennebec Purchase v. Tiffany, 1 Maine 219.
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The destruction of boundary monuments has been the subject 
of legislation in cur state. With regard to these our statute 
says: "Whoever wilfully and wantonly or maliciously injuries or 
removes any monument erected, or tree marked as a boundary of 
any land or town; destroys, defaces or alters the marks thereon, 
made for the purpose of designating such boundary; etc (dealing 
with mile stones, guide-boards, etc.) shall be punished, etc."
Maine, Revised Statutes, Chapter 12S, Sec. 19.
VI. Corner s.
Corners like monuments may be for the court or jury to de­
termine. What is sufficient to constitute a true corner is for 
the court to determine, and its identity is for the jury.
A.corner  was located as being opposite a point on a high­
way. The court held that the corner was located as a point on 
the side of the road where a line drawn at right angles to the 
road from the point located, would meet the side of the road.
Bradley v. Wilson, 5^ Maine 357*
In case the corner referred to is a known and ascertained 
point or is easily ascertainable upon the ground by a proper 
examination, the true location of such corner is the one re­
ferred to in the instrument.
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A deed was to "the ’westerly corner of land set off to William 
Cobb.", The corner was ascertainable . Court would not admit 
evidence that a stake was meant, which stood in a different 
place.
Pride v, Lunt, 19 Maine 115.
Government corners are conclusive when they can be found Pr 
the spot where they were originally established is definitely 
established. It makes not the least difference if the location 
was correct or otherwise.
Crogin v. Powell., 122 U. S. 691; 32 L.Fd. 566.
Government corners are of very little importance in regard 
to private boundaries with which this thesis deals. The writer 
will devote more time to other essential pointe called for by 
the subject. .
VII. Courses and Distances.
The general rule of the all powerful intent of the parties 
applies more strongly in the case of courses and distances than 
in other branches of this subject. If the intent of the parties, 
however, cannot be ascertained, courses are run as they are called 
for by the deed.
Four classes of lines are involved in courses, continuous, 
straight, meandering, parallel lines.
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The weight of authority is that a line the beginning of
which ie established will run and continue in the same direc­
tion, provided nothing contrary appears and is proved. The 
presumption also is that a line, the termini of which is given, 
is a straight line. The above would undoubtedly be upheld in 
Maine.
Suppose termini of the boundary be on a stream, and the 
line of boundary be the stream. The line would obviously follow 
the meander of the stream.
Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Maine 9.
The intention of the parties governs parallel lines.
Disputes often arise in cases in which a corner or course 
is lost. In such cases it is competent to establish such lost 
or disputed corner or course by running back, having reversed 
the courses and distances, from a proven corner or bound, hav­
ing proven the reversed course or distance.
Seidensparger v. Spear, 17 Maine 125; 35 Am. Dec. 23^*
As a general rule distances, provided they are not con­
trolled by other calls, are to be strictly applied. It ie plain 
that the line between two points is to be considered as meaning 
the shortest line.
It may often be that the distance given is to a monument 
13
in which case the monument, when proven, would control. However, 
if no terminating monument is named, it is clear that the line 
should be run by the exact courses and distances given.
Scammon et al v. Sawyer, Maine ^29.
No uniform rule has been established by the courts as re­
gards measurements on stream and shore. Each case must be decid­
ed according to the intent of the parties, considering all influ­
encing circumstances.
VIII. Conflieting Elements in Description.
A. In General.
As to just which of several elements of a description should 
be given more effect, there is no established rule, it is well 
established, however, that all vague and repugnant description 
must give place to any clearer description.
Ricker v. Barry, 3^ Maine 116.
The intention of parties has been dealt with in an earlier 
part of this thesis.
B. Courses and Distances.
The rule of law is that courses and distances must give place 
to boundaries visible and provable on the face of the earth.
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It is immaterial whether the bounds and monuments be natur­
al or artificial if they are in existence. However, it is also 
well established that in case of a call of quantity, courses 
and distances will control.
Chandler v. Green, 69 Maine 350-
In selecting which calls shall be supreme it is necessary 
that the intention of the parties, if possible, be given effect 
to in all cases.
Beal v. Gordon, 55 Maine 482.
Tenney, C. J., in an early case, in speaking of the con­
trolling forces of courses and distances said: "It is not, then, 
a case where monuments cannot be found, but where they cannot 
be reconciled one with another. And, if no mode could be found 
to ascertain the intention of the parties, as disclosed by mon­
uments, it is a case analogous to one, where monuments fail. In 
such a state of things, courses and distances are to govern."
Hamlinton v. Foster, 45 Maine 32.
C. Prior Description.
H Maine has no case on this point, but the tendency of our 
court, as gathered from its other holdings on boundary law, 
would tend to lead one to believe that it would agree with the 
weight of authority.
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In case two descriptions of the same property are used 
and are equally clear, the rule is that the prior description 
should be followed.
D. Marked Lines.
In case there are defined established lines that have been 
surveyed, they will be upheld as the real boundary and will not 
give place to other less certain matters of description. To 
quote Tenney, J., who said: ”If, however, there be a precise and 
perfect description, showing that the parties actually located 
the land upon the earth, and another, which is general in its 
terms, and they cannot be reconciled with each other, the latter 
may yield to the former.”
Herrich v. Hopkins, 23 Maine 217•
The court has further applied this doctrine. It has held 
that lines marked and surveyed would triumph over maps, field 
notes, etc.
Stetson v. Adamst 91 Maine 17$.
Courses and distances also give place to marked lines.
Mosher v. Berrys 30 Maine $3*
E. Natural Objects.
Natural objects, on account of their permanent nature,
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are of course of more value than calls in descriptions. Nat­
ural objects would control in case of conflict with artificial 
monuments, maps, plats, and field notes, provided the intention 
of the parties was not obviously contrary.
Courses and distances are also over-weighed by natural 
objects. -
This was established by an important case in which there is 
a dissenting opinion. The course and distance was in part, 
•thence south eighty-four degrees east one hundred and fifty- 
six rode to the pond to a stake and stones.” The stake and 
stones were gone, and the pond was found to be more than one 
hundred and fifty-six rods from the beginning point. Here there 
was clearly a case where natural objects and courses and.dis­
tances were in conflict. Justices Appleton, Hathaway, May and 
Chief Justice Tenney held that the pond being a natural object 
would govern. Justice Goodenow, dissented; but his reasoning 
was placed on other grounds.
F. Artificial Objects.
Artificial objects have the same controlling power over 
maps, calls of adjoiners and courses and distances as natural 
objects. The above has only one qualification, the artificial 
monument must be plainly capable of identification.
Esmond v. Tarbox, 7 Maine 6; 20 Am. Dec. J^6. 
Whitcomb v. Dutton, 89 Maine 212. 
Tyles v. Fickett, 7? Maine ^10.
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G. Metes and. Bounds.
Metes and bounds from which actual boundaries may be ascer­
tained invariably control courses, distances and quantity.
Chandler v. McCard, 38 Maine 56^ •
As stated previously, course and distances give place to 
other forms of description, and it may be said are of the least 
value.
H. Maps and Calle for Adjoiners,
Maps, plats and field notes are next in value. In general 
they control calls for adjoiners, metes and bounds, and courses 
and distances.
Haynes v. Young, 36 Maine 557«
Heaton v. Hodges, 1^ Maine 66; 30 Am. Dec.731*
Calls for adjoiners are controlling over courses and dis­
tances and metes and bounds, also over quantity.
Bryant v. M. C. R. R. Co., 79 Maine 312.
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IX. Particular Boundaries.
There are certain well defined classes of boundaries. The 
most important of these are buildings, highways, and waters.
A. Buildings.
The use of a building as a designation of a division line 
is not a common one. But in case a building is used as such the 
question of whether the wall of the building the line of
its eaves, projections or cornices, would mark the line, is im - 
portant. A distinction is made by the Maine court between the 
boundary line of a highway and that between adjoining land owners.
If the building marks the line of the highway the wall 
would be the line. The reason is obvious, The adjacent owner 
is entitled to the use of the air over a highway and to the use 
of the earth under it, as long as he does not interfere with 
the use of the highway by the public. It is reasonable there­
fore that the cornices would overhang the highway and the wall 
itself mark the boundary. Not so in regard to adjoining owners.
Walton, -J, said: "When land is bounded by a building, it 
would be unreasonable to assume that the parties to the convey­
ance intended that the main portion of the building should be on 
one side of the line, and the cornices, and other projecting fin­
ish, on the other. Hence the rule that in such cases the line 
shall be regarded as wholly on one side of every portion of the 
building.M
The above is a dictum from Farnsworth v. City of Rockland, 
$3 Maine 50^. The case involved the boundary of a highway and 
held as stated in a preceding paragraph.
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B. Hi ghways.
The use of a highway as a boundary is perhaps, the most com­
mon of the particular boundaries.
In using the term highway the intention is, on the part of 
the writer, to include only open and used roads. Such is the use 
of the term in the decisions of courts of law.
The most common way is to bound by a certain road or highway. 
Plainly this would include the land to the centre of the highway.
Webber v. Overlock, 66 Maine 77•
The following early case in Maine forms the basis for our 
holdings in regard to this point.
The grant read, in part,this: "Beginning on the westerly 
side of the county road, etc., etc." Held that this carried 
title to the centre of the highway.
Johnbon v. Anderson> 18 Maine 7&«
A closer case arose when a stake and stones was located on 
the side of the highway. The calls in the deed were, "On the 
east by" a certain road and the last call to the southerly poet 
in a pair of bare, on said road." Even the naming of a stake was 
not sufficient to limit the boundary to the side of the road.
Cottle v. Young, 59 Maine 105.
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In a similar case the course was "running by said road to 
a stake." Barrow, J., said; "The mere mention in the descrip­
tion of a fixed point on the side of the road as the place of 
beginning or ending of one or more of the lot lines, does not 
seem to be of itself sufficient .to prevent the passing of the 
title to the middle of the highway."
Low v. Tibbetts, 72 Maine 92.
Cottle v. Young, 59 Maine 105.
We have seen it is well settled that, unless expressly 
excluded, title passes to the centre of the road, provided gran­
tor had title thus far.
Hunt v. Rich, Maine, 195 •
The actually traveled road bed often varies from the re­
corded location. It is therefore necessary to determine which 
would govern. Maine settled this point in the case of Brooks v. 
Morrill, infras
The deed bounded the lot on the east "On the west line of 
said road." The issue in the case was whether the actual 
traveled road or the road as recorded should be considered as 
the boundary. The traveled road was held to be the boundary. 
In discussing the case, Whitehouse, J., said: "A road is a way 
actually used in passing from one place to another. A mere 
survey or location of a route for a road is not a road. A mere 
location for a road falls short of a road as much as a house
21
lot falls short of a house.
Brooks v. Morrill, 32 Maine 172.
The laying out of a new road, to replace an old one has not 
the least effect on the boundary lines.
Chadwick v. McCausland, ^7 Maine,
The highway must be a public highway and used as such. A 
street charted and indicated on the face of the earth is not 
sufficient if it has not become a public street.
A lot was sold and bounded on a street, "as laid down on 
said plan.” The street was not opened until after the grant. 
It was not a highway at the time of conveyancing. The public 
was not bound to accept the street. The boundary was the side 
of the prospective street. The grantee had only an easement 
in the prospective street until its opening, but did not own 
the land to its centre.
Bangor House v. Brown, 33 Maine 3°9«
This question of highways as boundaries can be’ summed up 
no better than by quoting Chief Justice Appleton: "It is un­
doubtedly true,” he said, "that where land is sold bounded by, 
upon, or along a highway, the thread or centre line of the same 
is to be presumed to be the limit and boundary of such land. 
But it is equally true that the grantor, by apt and fitting 
words, may exclude the presumption and reserve the entire road 
to himself subject to the easement of the public. He may bound
22
his grantee by the line of the road, and not by the road itself.
Cottle v. Young, supra.
Again, Chief Justice Appleton lays down the same principle 
by quoting Shaw, C. J. in Newhall v. Ireson, g Cushing 595. 
wLand no doubt may be bounded by the side of the highway but it 
must be done in clear and distinct terms to control the ordinary 
presumption.”
Before leaving the topic of highways I want to add that by 
statute in Maine our legislature has provided for the preserva­
tion of boundaries of highways. This only has to do with the 
extent of the easement so to speak and over what portion of the 
highway the easement exists.
Maine Revised Statutes of 1903,
Chap. 23, Sec. 11.
r
C• Waters.
Next to highways the most important particular boundary 
is waters.
In discussing waters I shall sub-divide the subject into, 
non-navigable waters, ponds and lakes, tidal waters and sea­
snore. Non-navigable streams, being the most common, will re­
ceive first attention.
(a) Non-navigable Streams.
Under ordinary circumstances it is the almost universal 
rule that a grant of land bounded on a non-navigable stream goes 
to the thread of the stream.
This was first ruled upon in Maine in the case of Morri­
son v. Keen, 3 Maine 472; and the opinion cited as authority was 
King v. King, 7 Mass. 49&.
When the meaning, however, is to exclude the flats as in 
the case in which the deed read, "thence east until it strikes 
the creek on which the mill stands, thence south-westerly on 
the west bank of said creek," Rice, J., in his opinion says, 
"to hold that a party may not bound a grant by the bank, mar­
gin, side, or shore of a stream of water, or by the side of a 
way, wall, ditch, or other similar object, would, involve an 
absurdity. In all cases where the language used clearly shows 
that to be the intention of the grantor, the bank, side, margin, 
or shore, become themselves monuments, and are to be treated as 
such."
Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Maine 9.
The public has an easement to pass to and fro on even 
non-navigable streams and the holding of the land under the 
water by the ripirian owner is subject to such easement.
It is clear that a grant to, by, or on the stream car­
ries title to fi1urn mediurn aquae, while express words may limit
it to the bank.
The writer knows of no case in Maine which settles just 
what is the thread, of the stream, but finds that the weight of 
authority is that the thread of the stream is midway between the 
banks when the water is at its natural level and neither at 
high nor low water mark. The main channels or currents are not 
important and have no bearing on the determination of what is 
the thread of the stream.
pratt v. Lamson, 2 Allen (Mass.) 275* 
Kimball v. Schoff, 40 N. H. 191.
The weight of authority in regard to side lines on non-nav- 
igable streams is that they extend from the termini of the line 
on the bank at right angles with the thread of the stream.
pee rf i_e Id v . A rms, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 41.
(b) Ponds and Lakes.
If the pond or lake be not what is termed a great pond, that 
is, being in extent more than ten acres,then the littoral 
owners own to the middle of the lake or pond. This is the same 
as in the case of ajnon-navi gable stream.
In the case of great ponds the littoral owner takes to low 
water mark. However this may be changed and they may be limited 
to high water mark by express words.
Wood v. Kelley, 30 Maine 47.
Bradley v. Rice, 13 Maine 19$.
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Artificial ponds and lakes have the same standing as natural 
ponds and lakes.
(c) Tidal and navigable Waters and Sea-shore.
In considering this division of my subject it is first 
necessary to define tidal and navigable waters, and to distinguish 
between them if any distinction exists.
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines tidal waters thus: "All 
arms of the sea, bays, creeks, coves, or rivers, in which the 
tide ebbs and flows, are properly denominated tide-waters.”
It would seem that our court from its previous decisions 
would hold that tidal and navigable waters are analogous, and 
that on waters that are navigable in fact but not tidal, the 
boundary line of the adjoining owner would go to the thread of 
the stream.
Granger v. Avery, 64 Maine 292.
Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Maine 9«
8. C. 50 Am. Dec. 641.
Storer y. Freeman, (6 Mass. 435)
Spring v. Russell, 7 Maine 273*
But to return to tidal waters. Our law on this point orig­
inated in the Colonial Ordinance of 1641 of Massachusetts. To 
use the words of Chief Justice Parsons, Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 
435* this ordinance provided, ’’that the proprietor of land ad­
joining on the sea or salt water, shall hold to low water mark,
26
where the tide does not ebb more than one hundred rods, but not 
more where the tide ebbs to a greater distance.11
This ordinance had the effect of changing the English law, 
and it is law in Massachusetts and Maine today. Since, at the 
time of its adoption, Maine was part of Massachusetts.
Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Maine 441.
Therefore, unless words are used such as by the bank, shore 
or highwater mark, the boundary of land bordering on tidal waters 
and the sea is at low water mark unless the tide ebbs more than 
one hundred rode.
Lapisli v. Bank, S Maine £5 • 
Stone v. Augusta, 46 Maine 127.
The term shore needs some discussion, as used in legal phras­
eology, it meant the flats between high and low water marks. Thus 
it is obvious that a grant to the shore and by the shore would 
extend only to high water mark,
Dunton v. Parker, 97 Maine 461.
A late Maine case was settled in 1905 that involved this 
whole law of boundaries on navigable tidal waters and sea-shore. 
This case elaborately discussed the different terms of exclus- 
sion.
I q uote Justice Savage thus: "But it must be remembered 
that the effect of the Colonial Ordinance upon the construction 
of deeds is merely to fix boundaries. A deed of the upland prima
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facie conveys flats,- net appurtenances nor privileges merely, 
out the land itself, subject to public uses,- to low water mark. 
On the other hand, we think it must be held that if, by descrip­
tive terms in the deed, the flats are excluded , they do not 
pass even as appurtenances or privileges. They are outside the 
boundaries fixed by the deed."
Thus we find that unless limited by words of exclusion 
the boundary line is the low water mark and the flats or shore 
pass if owned by the grantor.
Side line on flats are lines at right angles with the 
line joining the termini of the lines at the edge of the shore, 
and in case the portions of two owners overlap the same is di­
vided between them.
Colonial Ordinance 1640.
Ware v. Ware, 9 Maine 42.
In conclusion I wish to lay great stress on the controll­
ing, all-powerful effect of intention on the determining and 
establishing of boundaries.
It might be said that intention is the key to the law of 
boundaries. Therefore intention is first to be considered be­
fore giving effect to other elements in their established places 
by law. Instruments creating boundaries are to be construed 
so as to reflect the intention of the parties.
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It has been the purpose of the writer to consider the prin­
ciple, governing phases of the law of boundaries. To this end 
there are embodied in this thesis the leading cases in Maine 
on the several points. It was not proposed to embody all cases 
decided in our reports involving boundary law, but only cases 
illustrating the governing points, and from which the conclu­
sion of minor points must be obvious, have been used.
A few cases out-side our State have been cited and in like 
cases the writer believes that our court would follow the de­
cisions of the states thus cited.
